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Abstract
The development of formal ICT standards is a loose form of collab-
orative innovation: firms first develop rival technologies, some of which
are then eventually selected in the standard. Against this background,
firms often use informal consortia to define a clearer technology roadmap
ahead of the formal standard setting process. The paper aims to assess
how such consortia influence the volume of patents filed around standards,
and whether this is eﬃcient. We show that their eﬀect actually depends
on the strength of firms’ incentives to develop the standard. Consortium
membership triggers a higher number of patent files when insuﬃcient re-
wards for essential patents induce underinvestment in the standard. This
eﬀect is necessarily pro-eﬃcient. In situations where excessive rewards
induce patent races, consortium membership only moderately increases
or even reduces their volume of patents. At least in the latter case, the
eﬀect of consortia membership is also pro-eﬃcient.
We are grateful to Mark Schankerman, Andrew Updegrove and Stephan Gauch for helpful
discussion and data. We furthermore acknowledge valuable comments from participants at the
Asia Pacific Innovation Conference, the Telecom ParisTech Conference on Economics of ICT
- in particular Tobias Kretschmer - as well as the European Policy for Intellectual Property
and the Standardization and Innovation in Information Technologies Conferences.
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1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the number of essential patents1 claimed on ICT
standards has strongly increased (Simcoe, 2007). This evolution firstly denotes
the importance of these patents for firms: they can generate substantial licens-
ing revenues, and be used as bargaining chips to obtain freedom to operate on
rivals’ patent portfolios (Rysman & Simcoe, 2008). Another explanation lies
in the growing complexity of ICT standards. As compared with other sectors,
standardization in ICT has indeed evolved from the definition of mere specifi-
cations enabling interoperability to the joint development of large technology
platforms including critical technologies2 . Consequently, they tend to embody
a growing number of patented components.
While the conditions for licensing essential patents have been widely dis-
cussed (see e.g., Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Layne-Farrar & Lerner,
2011), the peculiar type of collaborative innovation they proceed from has
received less attention so far. Formal ICT standards are developed in stan-
dard setting organizations (SSOs)—such as ETSI (telecommunications) or IEEE
(electronics)—that are open to a broad range of stakeholders. Besides the large
number of participants, the originality of this process is that it does not involve
any ex ante contracting between the firms preparing to develop a standard (Gan-
glmair & Tarentino, 2011). The choice of standard specifications rather takes
place ex post in ad hoc working groups, based on the merit of rival technologies
available to solve a given technical problem. Firms thus compete in R&D ahead
of the working group meetings, thereby generating a large volume of patented
innovations of which only a fraction will eventually become essential.
This formal process generates costly R&D cost duplications and delays due
to vested interests (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Simcoe, 2012). Firms therefore
increasingly rely on informal consortia to take the lead in the standard setting
process (Cargill, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2006). Such consortia are fora wherein a
group of firms seek to agree on a common design that they will jointly push as a
standard. While some of them substitute for the lack of formal SDOs and issue
their own standards (e.g., Blu-Ray alliance or W3C for web protocols), most
consortia actually accompany formal standardization3. They are then a means
for members to better focus their R&D investments on a common roadmap
(Delcamp & Leiponen, 2012), thereby saving useless development costs while
enhancing their chances to obtain essential patents (Pohlmann and Blind, 2012).
Leiponen (2008) furthermore shows that participation in a consortium improves
1Patents are deemed essential to a standard if they cover technology that is necessary for
any implementation of this standard.
2As an example, the number of functionnalities and formats (e.g., email, video, internet)
supported by the late wireless comunication standards (3G and 4G) considerably exceed those
of the second generation (GSM, CDMA) that are limited to voice communication.
3These consortia can submit the joint technological proposals of their member committees
to the SDO for approval as part of a formal standard. ISO has for instance a formal fast track
agreement, the PAS (Publicly Available Specifications), which allows sponsoring organization
to receive a formal accreditation of their specification within six and nine months. JTC1 has
a similar policy of featuring Approved References Specifications (ARS).
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the capacity of firms to influence the technological decisions taken at the formal
SSO.
This paper aims to assess how such consortia influence the volume of patents
filed around formal standards, and whether this is eﬃcient. We show that their
eﬀect actually depends on the strength of firms’ incentives to develop the stan-
dard. Consortium membership induces a higher number of patent files in sit-
uations where insuﬃcient rewards for essential patents induce underinvestment
in the standard. This eﬀect is necessarily pro-eﬃcient. In situations where ex-
cessive rewards induce patent races, consortium membership only moderately
increases or even reduces their volume of patents. At least in the latter case,
the eﬀect of consortia membership is also pro-eﬃcient.
The implications of these results are twofold. They first highlight the cost
entailed by the loose coordination of R&D investments in formal SSOs. In this
context, they also suggest that the creation of informal consortia can be an
eﬃcient way to supplement formal SSOs. Consortia are indeed an eﬀective
means to unlock the development of standards when firms have insuﬃcient
incentives to contribute technology, while they do not significantly amplify the
race for essential patents when these incentives are strong.
The paper proceeds in two steps. We first develop a theoretical model to
analyse the eﬃciency of distributed innovation into a standard. We then assess
empirically the actual impact of consortia over a large panel of ICT standards.
Our model allows for some degree of rivalry between the firms’ innovations,
so that only a fraction of their patents eventually become essential. We firstly
establish that the level and eﬃciency of firms’ investments depend on the share
of the standard’s value that accrues to owners of essential patents. A public
good pattern involving sub-optimal investment prevails in equilibrium when the
licensing revenue of essential patents holders is not suﬃcient to cover their R&D
costs. Conversely, firms engage in a wasteful patent race when licensing profits
exceed total R&D costs.
Against this background, we introduce consortia as a means to mitigate
technology rivalry between member firms. By joining a consortium, a firm
may thus deflate its volume of patents by cutting irrelevant R&D investments,
or inflate it by seeking to develop more relevant innovations. We show that
consortium membership is always pro-eﬃcient if the first eﬀect dominates. A
patent-inflating consortium is also pro-eﬃcient in a public good equilibrium, but
it may actually harm eﬃciency in a patent race equilibrium if it induces an
excessive inflation of patents around the standard.
Drawing on this framework, we use a large panel of ICT standards to assess
the actual eﬀect of consortia empirically, respectively for standards entailing
over- and underinvestment. For this purpose, we have developed an original
dataset of standard-related patent applications at firm level, which we use as a
proxy for firms’ R&D investments. We also use information on the participation
of pure R&D firms in the standard development process in order to identify over-
investment patterns. We find that firms entering a consortium strongly increase
their patent files in most of the cases. This is however not true for standards
featuring an over-investment pattern: in these cases, consortia membership has
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a smaller, and in some cases negative eﬀect on firms’ patent applications. These
results thus suggest that consortia tend to enhance the eﬃciency of innovation
in the development of standards.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We present the theo-
retical model and its implications in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the empirical
strategy, the database and econometric results. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Theoretical framework
Value of the standard We consider a set N of n firms that take part in
the development of a standard. The standard embodies x =

i∈N xi essential
patents contributed by the firms, and its implementation is expected to generate
aggregate profits v (x) in the industry. These profits increase with the amount of
embarked technology, but with decreasing returns: v (x) > 0 and v (x) < 04 .
There are two ways in which firms can derive revenues from the standard.
Patent holders firstly appropriate a share r ∈ [0, 1] of the standard’s value
through the royalties they charge to implementors of the standards. Parameter
r can thus be thought of as reflecting the IP licensing policy of the standard
setting organisation (r = 0 denoting a royalty free policy). In line with common
practices regarding ICT standard, we assume that the share of the licensing
revenues that accrues to firm i ∈ N is proportionnal to its share of the essential
patents (xi/x).
The remaining part of the revenues, (1− r) v (x), accrue to the firms that
implement the standard in their products. Let si denote firm i’s share of these
revenues, which can be thought of as its share of the market for standard-
compliant products. We assume that all firms with si > 0 are involved in the
standard setting process (so that

si = 1). Other firms (sj = 0) may also con-
tribute patented inventions provided they have appropriate R&D capabilities,
but they will get a return only through royalty revenues.
Taking into account both sources of profits, the expected benefit of firm
i ∈ N is thus:
Bi = v (x)

r
xi
x
+ (1− r) si
	
R&D investments The definition of a standard is the outcome of an open
innovation process wherein firms submit innovations, some of which only will
be included in the standard specifications. Assuming constant and symmetric
per unit R&D costs c, the R&D cost function of firm i ∈ N is proportional to
yi, the number of patents it develops for the standard:
Ci = cyi
4These assumptions account for various possible specifications. The standard’s value v (.)
can in particular reflect a dynamic innovation process, if we define it as the expected outcome
λxπ/ (δ + λx) of a Poisson process whith hit rate λx, discount rate δ, and aggregate profits
π.
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Equation (1) in turn posits that only a fraction of these patents enventually
become essential.
xi
yi
= γi ∈ (0, 1) (1)
Firm i’s selection rate γi denotes the chance that one of its patented inventions
be eventually included in the standard specifications. Conversely, γ−1i measures
the number of patents that firm i must develop in order to obtain one essential
patent. We define technology rivalry between the firms as follows:
m =

i∈N
γ−1i ≥ n (2)
This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of complemen-
tarity or substituability between the firms’ innovations. Setting m = n implies
in particular that the firms’ innovations are perfect complements: each of them
can be adopted without evicting another one. More generally, the ratio m/n
provides us with a measure of the degree of rivalry between the diﬀerent technol-
ogy alternatives promoted by the firms. For instance, a ratio m/n = 10 means
that only one out of ten innovations developed for the standard will become
essential. At the firm level, observe finally that firm i has a relatively weak
position vis-à-vis other firms if γi < n/m.
2.1 Public good or patent race
We first highlight that two types of coordination failure that may prevail in this
context. Each firm i ∈ N defined by {γi, si} makes its investment decision so
as to maximize Bi − cyi. Solving this problem over xi yields the first order
condition below:
v (x)

r
xi
x
+ (1− r) si
	
+ rv (x)
x− xi
x2
=
c
γi
(3)
The term in brackets captures the public good nature of the standard. It
implies that firm i’s direct incentive to develop the standard is proportional to
the share of the value it can appropriate. The second term captures a patent
race eﬀect: To appropriate part of the expected profit, firm i needs to invest
more the higher the number of essential patents held by its R&D competitors.
It is easy to check that the LHS of equation (3) is decreasing in x, so that the
firms’ decisions are strategic substitutes.
Summing the FOC of all firms i = 1, n, we derive the joint R&D investment
x∗ in equilibrium.
1
n

v (x∗) + rv (x∗)
n− 1
x∗

= c
m
n
(4)
The aggregate marginal profits (LHS) again combine the properties of a
public good investment (marginal benefits are diluted when the number of firm
increases) and a patent race (when r > 0, extra incentives are stronger the
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larger the number of competitors). On the RHS, the aggregate marginal cost of
essential patents is higher when technology rivalry is strong (large m/n).
Observe also that the aggregate marginal cost does depend on the distribu-
tion of the γi between the firms, but only on the degree of technology rivalry at
the aggregate level (m/n). We use this property to study how the structure of
the incentives aﬀects the eﬃciency of firms’ investments. Let us consider a social
program wherein a unique representative firm with selection rate γ =

m
n
−1
maximizes aggregate profits:
max
x
Ω = v (x)− cx/γ
Comparing the outcome of this program with the equilibrium outcome, we
can establish the following result.
Proposition 1 Aggregate investment in equilibrium is eﬃcient if the licensing
revenues rv (x∗) equals the total R&D cost cx∗/γ. Firms invest in excess if
licensing revenues exceed total cost and they underinvest in the reverse case.
Firms’ incentices to innovate can induce either too much (patent race pat-
tern) or too little (public good pattern) investment. Which one prevails in
equilibrium depends on the balance between total licensing profit and the total
R&D cost at equilibrium. Firms engage a patent race if
rv (x∗) >
cx∗
γ
(5)
Intuitively, a patent race takes place when licensing is profitable per se, so
that firms will compete in R&D in order to preempt the essential patents. Con-
versely, the public good equilibrium emerges when firms’ incentives are primarily
driven by the possibility to use the standard.
Observe that condition (5) also implies that the participation of a pure R&D
firm i (si = 0) with average sucess rate γi = γ is profitable only in a patent race
equilibrium:
(5) ⇔ x
∗
i
x∗
rv (x∗)− cγx∗i > 0 (6)
Corollary 2 The participation of pure R&D firms signals a patent race pattern
in equilibrium.
We will use this result in the empirical section to infer the existence of a
patent race equilibrium from the participation of pure R&D firms. We can
finally observe that the number of firms does not determine the type of equilib-
rium that prevails, but its magnitude. Hence Proposition 1 and its corrollary
are robust to allowing free entry of firms in the standardisation game.
Corollary 3 The ineﬃciency pattern prevailing in equilibrium does not depend
on the number of firms, and is thus robust to free entry.
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2.2 Eﬃciency of consortium membership
Recall that the consortia we are interested in do not involve any formal contract-
ing or joint R&D decisions. They rather function as fora wherein participating
firms seek to agree on a mutually acceptable roadmap for specifications that
they will jointly push in the SDO. Accordingly, we posit that consortium mem-
bers can better focus their R&D eﬀort, thereby saving useless investments and
enhancing their chances of obtaining essential patents. Assuming that a sub-
set of firms K ⊂ N have created a consortium to support the standard setting
process, members thus benefit from a higher selection rate5: γk∈K > γk∈N\L
where L = K\{k}.
We focus on the consequences of firm k’s decision to join the consortium6.
Formally, this firstly translates into a positive shock on the new member’s se-
lection rate (dγk > 0). Since firm k can better screen irrelevant innovation
opportunities, this in turn induces a fall in the degree technology rivalry at the
aggregate level: dm/dγk = −γ−2k < 0. It thus follows directly from (4) that the
number of essential patents embodied in the standard increases in equilibrium.
Since the firm’s decisions are strategic substitutes, it is moreover clear from
(3) that firm k develops more essential patents while the other firms react by
developing less of them. Lemma 4 summarizes these results.
Lemma 4 Joining the consortium enables the new member to develop more es-
sential patents in equilibrium, while the other firms develop less essential patents.
The net eﬀect is positive, and thus induces an increase of the equilibrium value
of the standard v (x∗).
This result does not necessarily imply that an enlarged consortium coalition
is eﬃcient, since it does not take into account the induced variation of firms’
R&D costs. Indeed, deriving firms’ aggregate profits Ω = v (x∗) − c

i x
∗
i /γi
wrt γk and rearranging makes it possible to highlight the following three eﬀects:
∂Ω
∂γk
=
cx∗k
γ2k

A
+
∂x∗
∂γk

v (x∗)− c
γ

 
 
B
+ c

i
∂x∗i
∂γk

1
γ
− 1
γi

 
 
C
(7)
The first eﬀect corresponds to R&D costs savings induced by firm k’s ability
to reduce the volume of non-essential patents (A). It is clearly positive. The
second one is the net (cost/benefit) value of adding new essential patents to the
standard (B). It is clear from the term in brackets that it is positive in a public
5We implicitely assume here that the size of the consortium coalition does not change the
success rate of former members or consortium outsiders. In other words, the only eﬀect of
consortium membership is a better access to information of future specifications. The entry
of a new member in the coalition nevertheless indirectly aﬀects former members and outsiders
through the new member’s stronger ability to preempt essential patents in the standard.
6 In practice, firms have to pay significant membership fees to join consortia, and therefore
decide to do so only if they have significant stakes in the standard. The benefits in terms
of information and influence strongly depend on idiosyncratic factors such as the degree of
compatibility between the firms’ technology profiles and strategic agenda.
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good equilibrium. Indeed new patents can then mitigate firms’ lack of investment
in the standard. By contrast, developing more essential patents reduces joint
profits in a patent race equilibrium. Finally, the third eﬀect captures the cost
or benefit of reallocating the development of essential patents between the firms
(C). Its sign may be positive of negative, depending on the selection rate of
firm k as compared with the other firms. Lemma 5 summarizes these findings.
Lemma 5 A firm’s entry in the consortium deflates the volume of non-essential
patents, which is clearly eﬃcient. By contrast, the inflated volume of essential
patents may be ineﬃcient if i) a patent race pattern prevails in equilibrium
and/or ii) it entails a reallocation of R&D eﬀort from eﬃcient to ineﬃcient
firms.
In order to carry further the analysis, we now focus on the direct eﬀects
of firm k’s patenting strategy on joint profits, aside from the other firms’ reac-
tions7. We are especially interested in relating joint profits with the (empirically
obervable) total volume of patents filed by firm k. Assuming that firm k has
average selection rate (γk = γ), we can establish that
cx∗k
γ2k
+
∂x∗k
∂γk

v (x∗)− c
γ

> 0 ⇔ dy∗k < Δ
dx∗k
γ
(8)
where
dy∗k =
dx∗k
γ
− x∗k
dγ
γ2
is the variation of the total number of patents filed by firm k (that is, the
diﬀerence between the volumes of spared patents and new essential patents)
and Δ = γv (x∗) /c. Since Δ > 0, condition (8) clearly holds if the total
volume of firm k’s patents is deflated. This is quite intuitive, since firm k then
develops more essential patents and saves at the same time the R&D cost of an
even larger volume of useless patents.
The eﬀect of firm k’s move is more ambiguous if joining the standard has
a patent inflating eﬀect. Indeed the benefit of enhancing the standard’s value
must then be balanced with the cost of a larger volume of patents. As stated in
Proposition 6, the new member still invests more eﬃciently provided the public
good pattern prevails in equilibrium. Indeed, it thereby provides more of the
missing essential patents, and it does so at a lower cost thanks to consortium
membership. By contrast, and inflated volume of patents filed by the new
member may harm eﬃciency in a patent race pattern, unless the volume of
extra non-essential patents remains suﬃciently small to be compensated by the
benefit of new essential patents.
Proposition 6 Assume that a firm with average success rate joins the consor-
tium:
7This can also be interpreted as an approximation of the full eﬀects when the reactions
of the other firms are negligible. We will see in the next section that this interpretation is
actually supported by empirical evidence.
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• A deflated volume of patents filed by the new member is eﬃcient whatever
the ineﬃciency pattern prevailing in equilibium.
• A inflated volume of patents filed by the new member is eﬃcient in a public
good equilibirum. It becomes ineﬃcient in a patent race equilibrium when
it exceeds a positive threshold T ∈ (0, dx∗k/γ).
Proof. Observe also that Δ > 1 ⇔ v (x∗) − v (x∗) − c/γ > 0, which is the
condition for the public good pattern to prevail in equilibrium. Since dy∗k <
dx∗k/γ, it directly follows that condition (8) is also verified in a public good
equilibrium when firm k inflates its volume of patents. By contrast, the patent
race pattern prevails when 0 < Δ < 1. Hence joint profits can increase only if the
inflation of firm k’s patents remains moderate, that is if dy∗k < T ∈ (0, dx∗k/γ).
Otherwise, a strong inflating eﬀects induces a fall of joint profits.
3 Empirical analysis
This section in turn presents an empirical analysis of patent filings around a large
panel of ICT standards. Our purpose is to assess whether joining a consortium
changes the volume of patents filed by firms involved in standard development,
and what is the direction of this change. Drawing on the results of our theoretical
analysis, we assess this eﬀect separately for standards corresponding respectively
to a public good or patent race pattern.
3.1 Data and indicators
Our empirical analysis draws on a comprehensive dataset of technological stan-
dards including essential patents8. Our sample includes all ICT standards issued
between 1992 and 2009 by one of the major formal SSOs which operate on an
international level9 . Since we aim to focus on the interaction between formal
standardization and companion consortia, we exclude standards that are exclu-
sively developed by informal standards consortia (e.g. BluRay).
We furthermore restrict the analysis to standards including essential patents
of at least two diﬀerent companies, thereby limiting the sample to 578 standards.
Companies that own IPRs which are essential to a standard provide this infor-
mation to the respective SSO. We downloaded these patent declarations at the
websites of the above-mentioned SSOs in March 2010. From the PERINORM10
database we retrieve information on the date of first release, releases of further
versions and amendments, number of pages from the standard document such
as the technical classification of the standard.
8A summary of all relevant variables with description and sample statistics can be consulted
in Appendix 1
9 ISO, IEC, JTC1 - a joint committee of ISO and IEC -, CEN/CENELEC, ITU-T, ITU-R,
ETSI, and IEEE.
10PERINORM is the world’s biggest standard database with bibliographic information on
formal standards and is regularly updated by the SDOs DIN, BSI and AFNOR.
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Our sample includes 242 diﬀerent companies declaring essential patents, ob-
served over the whole period. For each firm, we collect yearly information on
the amount of sales, R&D expenditure, employees and market to book ratio
(Tobin’s Q11). In addition we distinguish between pure R&D firms, manufac-
turer and net provider12 and classify our sample by main active industry using
SIC codes.
We connect the firm level data to the specific standard information and built
up a panel of 1,720 company-standard pairs observed over a time span of 18
years (1992-2009). For each company-standard pair, we observe the amount of
patents filed by the respective company in the technological field for the respec-
tive standard, and include a dummy variable indicating whether the company
takes part in a consortium supporting the development of this standard. Other
time-variant control variables are either company- or standard-specific. Time-
invariant factors aﬀecting the firm, the standard or the relationship between
both are captured by company-standard pair fixed eﬀects.
Matching between informal consortia and formal standards To iden-
tify informal consortia accompanying the formal standardization process, we
use data from 15 editions of the CEN survey of ICT consortia and a list of con-
sortia provided by Andrew Updegrove. We identify approximately 250 active
ICT consortia13 . We categorize these consortia as to industry, function (spec
producer, promoter) and years of activity (see Appendix 1). The connection
to a standard in our sample is analyzed by using liaison agreements and in-
formation from consortia and SSO web pages. For instance, a connection was
identified, when a consortium explicitly references a formal standard, or when
a standard has been submitted to the formal SSO by an informal consortium.
We are conservative in establishing the connections, resulting in a narrow list of
54 consortia. We use supplementary information for the selected consortia and
further restrict the list to 21 consortia that technologically (spec producer) and
significantly contribute to this specific standard (excluding pure promoting con-
sortia)14 . Using information on the websites of the consortia as well as internet
archives (www.archive.org) and internet databases (www.consortiuminfo.org),
we inform consortium membership over time and connect this information with
the company standard pairs of our sample.
11We used the Thomson one Banker database to match the respective firm level data.
12We used the extended business model description in the Thomson One Banker database
and compared our classification to the list of companies identified by Layne-Farrar and Lerner
(2010).
13This is coherent with the identification of the CEN survey which reports approximately
250 standards consortia in ICT.
14Assisting this rather broad distinction we conduct a word count analysis on the consortia
self-description abstracts, kindly provided by Andrew Updegrove. We use keywords such as
“developing”, “creates”, “set standard” or “standardizes”. Appendix 1 provides a list of those
consortia and standards for which a link could be established, as well as the narrower list of
consortia contributing technologically.
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Standard-specific patents The most intuitive approach to track firms’ R&D
investments in standards is to count the patent declarations they state for
these standards. However, former empirical analyses have shown that the tim-
ing of declaration is not connected to the dynamics of standardization (Baron
and Pohlmann, 2010). Moroever essential patents only represent a very small
amount of patenting around standards (Bekkers et al., 2012). To avoid these
shortcomings, we thus build up a new measure of firms’ standard-specific R&D
investment. In a first step we count patents filed from 1992 to 2009 by the
companies in our sample at the three major patent oﬃces (USPTO, JPO and
EPO), using the PatStat database and the company assignee merging methods
of Thoma et al. (2010). We restrict the count of patent files to IPC classes in the
relevant technological field of each standard, identified by using the IPC classi-
fication of declared essential patents15 . We measure the dynamics of patenting
over the standard lifecycle (details can be consulted in Appendix 3). Our mean
value analysis shows a patenting increase before standard release and a decrease
thereafter. This finding reassures us that our variable captures the innovation
for a specific standard, which indeed is expected to culminate in the period
immediately preceding standard release.
Public good and patent race patterns One contribution of our analysis
is the comparison of over- and under investment in standardization. As shown
in the theroretical model, the patent race pattern can be identified when pure
R&D firms take part in the standard development. We use this prediction as
our identification strategy for the empirical sampling of standards. By label-
ing over- and underinvestment as to the classification above, we compare the
residual results of a regression of standard related patent files against techni-
cal characteristics of the standards(details can be consulted in Appendix 4). A
t-test analysis suggests that our classification of overinvestment is an appropri-
ate measure. Results show that residual values of the regression are in average
positive for standards where pure R&D firms participate to a standard and in
average negative for those where pure R&D firms are not involved.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Pairwise correlations In the following Table 1, we provide pairwise corre-
lations of firm-specific, standard-specific and firm-standard-specific variables at
the company-standard-pair level.
Insert Table 1 about here
15This method is a novel way of measuring standard-specific R&D investment. We ap-
ply tests of timing, estimate technological positions of standards as well several test of size
measures to prove our proposed variable to be a suﬃcient indicator of standard-related R&D
investment. The methodology and the various tests have been presented at the Patent Sta-
tistics for Decision Makers Conference 2011 at the USPTO and can be reviewed in Appendix
3.
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The volume of patents around standards is negatively correlated with both
consortium membership and the existence of a consortium on the standard. This
could indicate that consortia attract companies with smaller standard-related
patent portfolios. On the other hand, consortium membership is positively
correlated with the value of sales and the number of employees. The existence
of consortia is positively correlated with the number of firms per standard and
with standard age. As to the correlation analysis eﬀects are yet not strong
enough to derive conclusive interpretations.
Diﬀerence in means In the following Table 2, we present diﬀerences in the
volume of patents, the number of employees, the value of sales and the book-to-
market ratio between consortia member observations and the rest. Membership
observation is associated with a lower volume of standard-specific patents, but
a higher number of employees and a higher value of sales.
Insert Table 2 about here
3.3 Multivariate Analyses
Estimation methodology We use our panel dataset to estimate how con-
sortium membership aﬀects the volume of patents filed around the related stan-
dard. Our dependent variable is the number of patent priority filings by firm
i for standard j in year t. Our first key explanatory variable, memberijt, is
a dummy equal to one for years where the firm i participates in a consortium
supporting standard j. Following the theoretical model, we expect its eﬀect to
depend upon whether the standard is initially characterized by over- or underin-
vestment. We therefore also interact the consortium membership dummy with
the over_investmentj variable, denoting the share of pure R&D firms involved
in the develoment of standard j.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity of standards and companies, we
systematically include fixed eﬀects for company-standard pairs. As our depen-
dant variable is a count variable with overdispersion with respect to a poisson
distribution, we will use a poisson estimator with robust standard errors unless
explicitly stated otherwise16 . We furthermore cluster standard errors by com-
panies in order to exclude that unobserved shocks to a company’s patenting
level bias the standard errors and lead to an insuﬃciently restrictive confidence
interval17 . Unsurprisingly, we found strong evidence for persistent eﬀects of
transitory shocks to our explained variable, as indicated by positive autocorre-
lation of standard errors. We therefore include the lagged dependent variable
as explanatory variable in all models.
16We prefer the poisson estimator with robust standard errors over a negative binomial
estimator with fixed eﬀects, because the negative binomial estimator cannot totally control
for fixed eﬀects and thus account for unobserved heterogeneity.
17All presented results are robust to clustering standard errors by standard instead of by
company.
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Our basic regression model has the following specification:
st_patentsijt = exp (α1.st_patentsijt−1
+β1.memberijt
+β2.memberijt ∗ over_investmentj
+β3.st_activityjt−1
+F it−1β4 +X

tβ5 + cjt + εijt

where st_activityjt−1 counts version releases and amendments per year, Fit−1
is a vector of firms specific change such as a measure of Sales and Tobins’s Q,
Xjt−1 denotes other control variables for time trends such as the overall ICT
patent files and the count of patent declarations, cjt are standard age dummies
and εijt is an idiosyncratic error term.
We use the standard age dummies, each indicating a one year period in the
standard lifetime, to control for the timing of standardization. Downstream
innovation and patenting (taking place after the first release of the standard) is
indeed likely to peak around periodical revisions of standards. The release of
new standard versions or amendments to existing versions is labeled as standard
activity and included as a control variable. In order to exclude immediate
feedback (amendments or version releases explained by prior innovation), we
include this control variable with a one-year lag.
We furthermore wish to account for external shocks such as the business
cycle or technology-related policy. As we already control for standard fixed
eﬀects and standard age, it is impossible to include year dummies as a further
control because of a collinearity problem. We therefore control for external
shocks by including the overall number of triadic patent priorities filed per year
in the relevant technological category (respectively IPC class G for telecom and
IPC class H for IT standards) and the overall number of patent declarations
made to any formal ICT standard per year in order to capture policy shocks
that are more specifically relevant to essential patents.
Models 1-4 Consortia are more likely to be created for important or tech-
nologically complex standardization projects. Furthermore, the organization of
R&D can be diﬀerent if a consortium is created for a standard. For these rea-
sons, the timing of standardization is likely to be aﬀected by the existence of
consortia. It is thus preferable to estimate all coeﬃcients, including controls
for standard timing, only on the sample of standards related to an informal
consortium. This strategy could however bias downwards the estimated eﬀects
of consortia, if some of these eﬀects are systematically captured by control vari-
ables. We therefore present results based upon the whole sample in model M1.
As expected, the coeﬃcients on consortia variables are higher in the larger sam-
ple, but the fit of the model is much lower. This indicates that heterogeneity
between standards with consortia and other standards is large. We therefore
only estimate standard with accompanying consortia in all following models
(M2-M4), while acknowledging a potential downward bias on our consortia co-
eﬃcients.
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In our second model (M2), consortium membership has a significant posi-
tive eﬀect on the volume of standard-specific patents, but the level of this eﬀect
decreases with the level of overinvestment. This result is however potentially
subject to an endogeneity bias. Unobservable variables, such as changes in the
strategic importance of the standard for the specific company, may have an im-
pact on both standard specific patents and consortium membership. External
factors jointly aﬀecting consortium membership and related patenting are par-
ticularly likely to occur in periods of turmoil, like the internet bubble in 2001.
While desirable in order to reduce within-groups bias on weakly endogenous
variables (Nickell, 1981; Bloom et al., 2005), the long period of observation (rel-
atively to the fast-evolving world of ICT standards) increases the vulnerability
to this type of biases.
Insert Table 3 about here
In order to deal with these concerns we restrict the observation period to 8
years from 2002 to 2009. Furthermore, we also reduce the cross-section dimen-
sion of the panel, by restricting the sample to stock-market listed companies.
These companies are more likely to react in a similar fashion to external events.
Finally, we identify positive or negative shocks to the number of employees in
a one year period18, indicating mergers, acquisitions, restructuring etc. If this
shock takes place after 2005, all observations after the shock are dropped for
this company, if the shock takes place earlier, we drop all previous observations.
Companies with more than one shock are dropped altogether for our third model
(M3), reducing the sample to 174 groups and 999 observations.
In our last model M4 we furthermore tackle endogeneity more directly by
including time-varying firm characteristics as control variables. We choose to
include the value of sales, and Tobin’s Q as a measure of expected profits (both
lagged by one year to exclude immediate feedback). We opt for not including
employees, which is highly correlated with sales in the within dimension (both re-
flecting company growth). Furthermore, the number of employees, with respect
to the value of sales, is likely to be more important for determining whether a
company has the possibility to participate in a consortium, but less important in
independently determining the evolution of patenting19. By including the value
of sales as a control, we nevertheless face the risk to bias downwards the esti-
mates of the consortia eﬀects for smaller companies refraining from joining an
expensive consortium. We therefore divide the level of consortia member fees20
by the value of sales of the company at the time of consortium creation. The
first percentile of observations according to this value (the companies-standard
pairs characterized by the highest consortia fees relative to the value of sales) is
18 distribution, the lower 5% are labeld as negative shocks.
19The primary cost of consortium participation is workload, while the cost of patenting is
primarily financial
20 Since our goal is to estimate the financial burden to join a consortium we use the low range
of membership fees (find an overview of highest and lowest membership fees in the appendix
1).
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most at risk to be aﬀected by this eﬀect. We therefore decide to exclude these
observations, leaving us with 158 company-standard pairs and 884 observations
in model 4.
M1-M4 show robust results. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients decreases
but the eﬀects are yet more significant, and the signs of the coeﬃcients are
unchanged.
Further robustness checks We check for robustness of our results to a cor-
relation of our main explanatory variables with past outcomes of the dependent
variable. It is plausible that a company’s decision to join a consortium depends
upon its stock of related patents. In this case, the regressors are predetermined,
and the poisson fixed eﬀect estimator yields inconsistent results (Blundell et
al., 1999). In order to account for this problem, we take advantage of the fact
that we have information on pre-sample levels of our dependent variable and
adopt the methodology suggested in Blundell et al. (1999), substituting pre-
sample means for fixed eﬀects. The results displayed in Appendix 5 are mainly
consistent with the results from the fixed eﬀect analysis.
Eﬀect of consortium member share So far we have estimated the eﬀect
of consortium membership on the volume of patents of the respective company.
In this section, we will estimate the eﬀect of the consortium member share
(indicating how many of the firms contributing to the standard are member
of the consortium) on the volume of patents filed by members and outsiders.
Finally, by estimating the eﬀect of consortium member share on patents filed
by all companies, we obtain a measure of the net eﬀect of consortia.
As compared to the previous analysis, this method is less prone to endogene-
ity biases, as the decisions of other companies to join a consortium are probably
relatively unrelated to a firm’s own current or expected future R&D eﬀorts. We
are therefore less restrictive regarding the sample, and only drop observations
for 2001 or earlier and of standards with no consortium within the observation
period. On the other hand, the member share is sensitive to the membership
decision of the firm itself, especially if the number of firms on the standard is
low21. In order to check for robustness to this sensitivity, we present all results
for a narrower subsample of standards including at least 6 contributing firms.
We estimate the eﬀects of consortium member share separately for consor-
tium members and non-members and for both. For the purpose of this analysis,
a firm is labeled as a member over the whole period of observation, if it is consor-
tium member at least once within this period. It is labeled consortium outsider
if it has never been consortium member over the period of observation. We con-
trol for time-variant firm characteristics, standard-company fixed eﬀects, the
lagged dependent variable and external shocks. Results are displayed in Table
4.
21 If we substracted the company itself from the consortium size variable, this count would
be nevertheless sensitive to company membership, as we estimate the eﬀects separately for
consortium members and non-members.
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Consortium members react to increasing consortium member share by inflat-
ing their patent filings, but this eﬀect decreases with the level of overinvestment
(model 5). Consortium outsiders do not react in a statistically significant way
to changes in consortium member share (model 6). The overall eﬀect (the eﬀect
indistinctly for members or outsiders) of increasing consortium member share
on the volume of standard-specific patents is positive and significant, but this
eﬀect decreases significantly with the level of over-investment (model 7).
Insert Table 4 about here
Net eﬀects Our results suggest that nearly all eﬀects of consortia depend
upon the initial level of overinvestment. In order to be able to discuss the eﬀect
of consortia on patenting, one should therefore relate the estimated coeﬃcients
to the sample values of the overinvestment indicator. We calculate the net
eﬀects from the results of model 5 (for the eﬀect of consortium membership) and
model 7 (the overall eﬀect of consortium member share in the whole sample).
We find that the eﬀect of consortia membership is positive for any share of
non-practicing entities not exceeding 6 %. This is the case for 92,12% of the
observations. The eﬀect of consortia member share on overall volume of patents
is positive for any share of non-practicing entities below 9 %. This is the case for
94,13% of the observations. These results indicate that the eﬀects of consortia
membership and consortia member share on standard-specific R&D are positive
in a broad majority of standards22 . However, they also suggest that consortia
can have a deflating eﬀect in a minority of standards that are characterized by
a particularly strong patent race pattern.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper is to assess how consortia influence the volume of
patents filed around formal standards, and whether this is eﬃcient. In the first
theory section, we defined consortia as a means to reduce the degree of rivalry
between the firms’ innovations. Accordingly, consortium members can obtain
essential patents at a lower average cost, by better targeting R&D investments.
The eﬀect on the volume of patents filed around the standard is however am-
biguous. By joining a consortium, a firm may indeed file less patents by cutting
irrelevant R&D investments, or more of them if it seeks to develop more technol-
ogy inputs for the standard. We have established that consortium membership
is always pro-eﬃcient if the first eﬀect dominates. A patent-inflating consortium
is also pro-eﬃcient in a public good equilibrium, but it may actually harm eﬃ-
ciency in a patent race equilibrium if it induces an excessive inflation of patents
around the standard.
Our empirical analysis makes it possible to assess which eﬀect actually dom-
inates, depending on the investment pattern — public good or patent race —
22The negative eﬀect of consortia membership and relative consortia size on R&D investment
in situations of overinvestment is however stronger than this positive eﬀect.
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prevailing for a given standard. When joint investments are suboptimal (public
good pattern), the observed rise in patent files indicates that consortium mem-
bership induces firms to develop more innovations, rather than saving R&D
costs. Since royalty-based incentives are weak in this case, this suggests that
their reaction is chiefly driven by the opportunity of enhancing the value of
the standard by developing more essential components. Consortia are thus an
eﬃcient way to supplement the lack of R&D investments when incentives to
develop the standards ar not suﬃcient.
Empirical results diﬀer when the patent race pattern prevails. For most
standards, new consortium members still increase their patent applications, but
in significantly lesser proportions than in the public good cases. Since firms have
strong strategic incentives to develop essential patents, this suggests that there
are few opportunities left for developing innovations that are relevant to the
standard. For some standards featuring strong overinvestment, we even oberve
that consortium members reduce their investments — consortia being then used
to save R&D costs by eliminating irrelevant R&D investments. These results
thus indicate that the creation of consortia does not significantly accentuate
patent races, and rather has a proeﬃcient deflating eﬀect for at least a minority
of standards around which overinvestment is particularly strong.
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Pairwise correlations on the company-standard level
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1 St. R&D 
Invest. 
1.00   
2 Member -0.10 *** 1.00   
3 Consortia 
Exists 
-0.14 *** 0.67 *** 1.00   
4 Standard 
Event 
-0.07 *** 0.39 *** 0.58 *** 1.00   
5 Tobin's Q 0.02 0.01 -0.04 * -0.05 * 1.00   
6 Sales 0.11 *** 0.06 *** 0.01 -0.01 -0.25 *** 1.00   
7 Em-
ployees 
0.10 *** 0.06 ** 0.01 0.02 -0.33 *** 0.87 *** 1.00   
8 Number 
of Firms 
0.05 ** 0.34 *** 0.60 *** 0.62 *** -0.09 *** -0.02 0.00 1.00 
9 Standard 
Age 
-0.07 *** 0.17 *** 0.29 *** 0.32 *** -0.20 *** 0.00 0.05 ** 0.25 ** 
  
Table 2: Differences in variable means between consortia members and others 
t =   4.1256 Standard Specific Patent Files 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 261 2,238.6 190.8 3,081.9 1,862.9 2,614.2 
not consortium members 1,571 12,092.8 972.8 38,559.2 10,184.6 14,001.0 
t =  -2.4585 Employees 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 272 125,635.0 6,929.8 114,289.8 111,991.9 139,278.2 
not consortium members 1,645 106,528.7 2,945.1 119,448.5 100,752.2 112,305.2 
t =  -2.6035 Sales 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 272 40,119.1 1,774.0 29,257.4 36,626.5 43,611.6 
not consortium members 1,644 35,211.2 708.4 28,721.6 33,821.8 36,600.6 
t =  -0.2502 Book-To-Market Ratio 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 243 1.7 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.9 
not consortium members 1,240 1.7 0.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 
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Appendix 1: Summary of relevant variables
Variable Description Level of Obs. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Standard 
Specific 
R&D 
Triadic Patent 
Priority Filings by 
this firm in the 
standard-related IPC 
classes 
Firm-
Standard-
Year 
31,020 1,072 4,022 0 91,121 
Member 
Membership of this 
Company in the 
Consortium related to 
this standard 
Firm-
Standard-
Year 
39,816 0.058 0.234 0 1 
Over 
Investment 
The share of non-
producing entities 
for this standard 
Standard 31,312 0.120 0.138 0 1 
Standard 
Event 
Sum of Amendments 
and version 
Releases 
Standard-
Year 
36,918 0.292 0.979 1 37 
ICT Patent 
Files 
Triadic patent 
priority filings 
by all firms in either 
Telecom or IT 
Standard-
Year 
37,621 223,320 52,748 132,721 301,890 
Patent 
Declarations 
Number of patent 
declarations to all 
formal standards 
Year 
39,834 3,538 4,038 78 13,938 
Tobin's Q Market-to-book ratio of the firm Firm-Year 11,740 1.702 1.598 0.076 8.257 
Sales Value of sales per year in Million USD Firm-Year
17,780 35,694 30,172 895 199,925 
  
Appendix 2: Linkages between standards and informal consortia  
Consortia Name 
MatchStand
ard Incl Consortia Name MatchStandard Incl Consortia Name 
MatchStandar
d Incl 
EPCglobal EN300220 No WiMax IEEE802.16 Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-14 Yes 
DVB  EN300468 No 
Cable 
Laboratories IEEE802.1Q Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-15 Yes 
DVB  EN301192 No 
FCIA - Fibre 
Channel 
Industry 
Association IEEE802.1Q No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-16 No 
DVB  EN301199 Yes MEF IEEE802.1X No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-18 Yes 
DVB  EN301790 No IETF IEEE802.21 Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-19 No 
DVB  EN301958 Yes (GEA IEEE802.3 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC1449
6-2 Yes 
EPCglobal EN302208 No AUTOSAR 
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-2 No 
DVB  EN302304 No FCIA  
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-20 No 
DVB  EN302307 No HGI  
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC1449
6-3 Yes 
DVB  EN302583 No IETF 
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-3 Yes 
DVB  EN302755 No MEF 
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-4 Yes 
DVB  ES200800 Yes ODVA 
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-5 Yes 
IETF ES201108 Yes OIF 
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC1449
6-6 Yes 
IETF ES202050 Yes Rapidio 
IEEE802.3/ISO
IEC8802-3 No TAHI 
ISO/IEC1454
3-2-1 No 
IETF ES202212 Yes IETF 
IEEE802.5/ISO
IEC8802-5 No IETF 
ISO/IEC1544
4-1 No 
WORLDDAB 
FORUM ETS300401 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC10118-
2 No IETF 
ISO/IEC1544
4-12 No 
DVB  ETS300814 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC10118-
3 Yes IETF 
ISO/IEC1544
4-2 No 
DVD 
ETSIEN30
0468 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC10536-
3 No IETF 
ISO/IEC1544
4-3 Yes 
IETF G.711 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC10918-
1/ITU-TT.81 Yes IETF 
ISO/IEC1544
4-5 No 
IETF G.722 Yes TOG 
ISO/IEC10918-
1/ITU-TT.81 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1569
3-2 No 
IETF H.263 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11172-
1 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1569
3-3 No 
IMTC H.323 Yes DVD 
ISO/IEC11172-
2 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1800
0-1 No 
IMTC H.324 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11172-
2 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1800
0-2 No 
IETF 
IEC618341
1 No DVD 
ISO/IEC11172-
3 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1800
0-3 No 
TOG 
IEEE1003.
1/ISOIEC9
945 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11172-
3 Yes EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1800
0-4 No 
PICMG 
IEEE1101.
1 Yes INCITS ISO/IEC11693 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1800
0-6 Yes 
OCP-IP 
IEEE1149.
1 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11694-
1 No AIM  
ISO/IEC1800
0-6 No 
BPMI  
IEEE1226.
5 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11770-
3 No AIM  
ISO/IEC1800
0-7 No 
OMG 
IEEE1226.
5 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889-
1 Yes EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC1800
0-7 Yes 
PWG IEEE1284 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889-
2 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IEC1809
2 No 
1355 Association IEEE1355 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889-
3 Yes EUROSMART  
ISO/IEC1809
2 No 
1394TA  IEEE1394 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889-
4 Yes NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC1809
2 Yes 
AUTOSAR IEEE1394 No DMPF 
ISO/IEC13818-
1/ITU-
TH.220.0 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC1979
4-3 No 
DVD IEEE1394 No DVD 
ISO/IEC13818-
1/ITU-
TH.220.0 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC1979
4-6 Yes 
HAVi IEEE1394 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818-
1/ITU-
TH.220.0 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IEC2365
1 No 
PWG IEEE1394 No DVD 
ISO/IEC13818-
2/ITU-TH.262 No 
GS1 – 
(Formerly EAN) 
ISO/IEC2473
0-2 No 
ODVA 
IEEE1588/I
EC61588 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818-
2/ITU-TH.262 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IEC2836
1 No 
ACCELLERA 
IEEE1800/I
EC62530 No TOG 
ISO/IEC13818-
2/ITU-TH.262 No TAHI 
ISO/IECDIS2
9341 No 
ACCELLERA IEEE1801 Yes DVD 
ISO/IEC13818-
3 No UPnP Forum 
ISO/IECDIS2
9341 Yes 
Homeplug IEEE1901 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818-
3 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IECDIS2
9500 No 
IVI 
IEEE488.1/
IEC60488-
1 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818-
7 No 3GPP2  Q.703 No 
ASTM 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No EUROSMART  
ISO/IEC14443-
1 No DVB  TS102474 No 
Bluetooth 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443-
1 No DECT Forum  TS102527 No 
DLNA 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443-
1 No DVB  TS102584 No 
ewc      
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No EUROSMART  
ISO/IEC14443-
2 No DVB  TS102611 No 
HGI  
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443-
2 Yes 
TV Anytime 
Forum TS102822 No 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443-
2 No DVB  TS102825 No 
Wi-Fi Alliance 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 Yes EUROSMART  
ISO/IEC14443-
3 No IMS FORUM TS123002 No 
100VG-Anylan 
Forum 
IEEE802.1
2 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443-
3 Yes 3GPP2  TS123401 No 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
2/ISOIEC8
802-12 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443-
3 No 3GPP2  TS123402 No 
Bluetooth 
IEEE802.1
5.1 No EUROSMART  
ISO/IEC14443-
4 No 3GPP2  TS133402 No 
WiMedia 
Alliance 
IEEE802.1
5.3 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443-
4 Yes DRM TS201980 No 
DISA  
IEEE802.1
5.4 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443-
4 No IETF V.44 No 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
5.4 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC14496-
1 Yes 3GPP2  X.509 No 
TAHI 
IEEE802.1
5.4 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC14496-
1 No ASTM X.509 No 
ZigBee 
IEEE802.1
5.4 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC14496-
10 Yes 
Cable 
Laboratories X.509 Yes 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
6 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC14496-
10 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC1449
6-
10/ITUH.264 Yes 
   MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC14496-
12 Yes    
  
Appendix 3: Empirical Methodology for measuring standard-related 
R&D
We identified the relevant technological field for each standard by using the 
7-digit IPC1 classification of the declared standard essential patents, to then 
count patents filed by each company in the identified IPC classes. We 
counted all patents filed from 1992 to 2009 by the companies in our sample 
at the three major patent offices (USPTO, JPO and EPO), using the PatStat 
database and company assignee merging methods of Thoma et al. (2010). 
This merging yields 13 million patent files. We aggregated these patents to 
INPADOC patent families and informed the IPC classification and the year 
of priority. To create our explained variable, we computed for each 
company-standard pair and year the number of patents filed in the relevant 
IPC classes for the standard of observation. 
This method is a novel way of measuring standard-specific R&D 
investment, and we therefore have to conduct a reliability analysis. We 
compute for each company-standard pair the mean number of patents filed in 
one year periods before and after standard release (t=0) and report the 
standard derivation for high and low values (figure1). The resulting pattern 
is a convincing description of the innovation process around standardization: 
the number of patents filed is highest in the years immediately preceding 
standard release, and sharply decreases after the release of the standard. The 
further we move away from the development phase of the standard, the 
lower are the calculated numbers of relevant patents. We believe that these 
findings are important arguments corroborating our methodology. 
Figure1: mean number of patents filed in years before and after standard 
release 
                                               
1 International Patent Classification
Appendix 4: Empirical Methodology for sorting standards into cases 
of over- and underinvestment
Based upon the theoretical model, we use the contribution of pure R&D 
firms to indicate overinvestment in a standard. We observe contribution of 
pure R&D firms in a standard using our database of companies that declare 
patents. Only firms that declare at least one patent on a standard are 
considered as contributors. Firms are classified as pure R&D firms using the 
business description database of Thomson One Banker and the companies 
identified by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011).  
Using this classification, we create two sub samples, one where pure 
R&D firms contribute to the standard and one where pure R&D firms are not 
at place. We test over- and underinvestment by predicting the residual values 
of our specification. We run a linear fixed effect regression of our firm-
standard pairs explaining patent files per year, controlling for standard 
dynamics and year trends and estimate the linear residual values2. We then 
compare the means of our residual values in both subsamples (pure R&D 
firms participate or not) conducting a t-test analysis. 
The result of the t-test analysis in table 5 shows that in the case of 
overinvestment (pure R&D firms contribute), the mean residual value is 
positive and significantly higher compared to the subsample of 
underinvestment (pure R&D firms do not contribute). The estimated residual 
values indicate the level of patenting predicted upon our estimation equation. 
The differences of residual values among our observations thus reflect the 
heterogeneity of patent behavior among observations and help us to find 
proof for different outcomes of patenting when pure R&D firms contribute 
to a standard or not. Our findings indicate to confirm predictions from our 
theoretical model that pure R&D firms would only participate in 
standardization, when the licensing of the standard is characterized by a 
situation of overinvestment (positive residual values).  
Table5: T-test of residual values from a fixed effect regression on patent 
files controlled for standard dynamics and year trends 
T-test of linear residual values by pure R&D firms contribution  
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
pure R&D firms do not contribute  16,121 -0.2435 0.0193 2.4512 -0.2814 -0.2057
pure R&D firms contribute  11,441 0.1145 0.0237 2.5347 0.0680 0.1609
combined 27,562 -0.0949 0.0150 2.4924 -0.1244 -0.0655
diff  -0.3580 0.0304  -0.4176 -0.2984
t = -11.7797 
degrees of freedom =    27560 
Ha: diff != 0  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000  
                                               
2 We change our poisson specification to a liner regression, since residual values of poisson estimators will 
not produce conclusive results. We log transform our count variable of patent files and run a linear OLS fixed 
effect regression model to then predict the linear residual values in a post estimation analysis. 
Appendix 5: Robustness check substituting pre-sample means for 
fixed effects
We apply the methodology developed by Blundell et al. (1999) to control for 
predetermined regressors. The authors suggest substituting the pre-sample 
averages of the dependent variable for the group fixed effect. While the fixed 
effects are estimated over the sample period, and are thus affected by the 
feedback of predetermined regressors, the pre-sample means are exogenous 
to the sample period values of the regressors. Analogous to our previous 
analysis, we set the period of observation from 2002 to 2009. In choosing the 
appropriate pre-sample period (1982-1992 or 1992-2001), we have to trade 
off endogeneity (several consortia memberships observed in the sample 
period have already existed in the period from 1992 to 2001) against 
heterogeneity (closer pre-sample values are a better approximation of the 
sample fixed effect than more remote pre sample information). As this 
model is intended to complement a fixed effect analysis, we choose the 
average of the period from 1982 to 1992 as pre-sample values3. We control 
for the same variables and operate the same sample restrictions as in the 
main models of our empirical tests. As our dependent variable is over-
dispersed with respect to a poisson distribution and we no longer include 
group fixed effects, we now opt for a negative binomial regression. This 
allows us to further add standard dummies. The results are displayed in table 
6. The coefficients of the consortia membership variables of models 11-1 
and 11-2 as well as 12-1 and 12-2 are similar to our previous poisson fixed 
effect analysis with clustered standard errors. Models 11-1 and 11-2 estimate 
the firm level membership effect, while models 12-1 and 12-2 estimate the 
overall membership net effect. We run two models including and excluding 
the lagged sales variable and restricting the observations to 2002-2009. Our 
estimations provide significant results for the consortia variables in all 
models. Furthermore the coefficients of the pre-sample means are positive 
and significant in all specifications, which indicates that controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity of the patent behavior is important. 
  
                                               
3 Additionally including the closer pre-sample information (1992 to 2002) does not alter significantly the 
reported results. 
Table 6: Robustness analysis with mean scaling and negative 
binominal estimation
 M11-1 M11-2 M12-1 M12-2    
 Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
Member 0.474***
(0.094) 
0.186* 
(0.101)   
Member * 
Over Investment 
-1.969***
(0.62) 
-1.273** 
(0.635)   
Member_share 
  
1.162*** 
(0.212) 
1.947*** 
(0.269) 
Member_share * 
Over Investment   
-5.931*** 
(1.418) 
-12.757*** 
(1.823) 
Lag1 Patent Files1 0.117***
(0.006) 
0.105*** 
(0.007) 
0.117*** 
(0.005) 
0.103*** 
(0.006) 
ICT Patent Files1 0.002***
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Patent Declarations1 0.001
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
Pre Sample Means 
(1982-1992) 
0.162***
(0.055) 
0.427*** 
(0.089) 
0.173*** 
(0.052) 
0.457*** 
(0.081) 
Lag1 Sales1
  
-0.007*** 
(0.001)  
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Constant -0.730*** 
(0.158) 
-1.014***  
(0.298) 
-0.908***  
(0.162) 
-1.277***  
(0.297) 
Standard Dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Standard Age Dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Log Likelihood -26,487.9 -13,642.7 -26,492.5 -13,622.5 
AIC 53,071.9 27,383.5 53,081 27,343.1 
BIC 53,369.9 27,653.3 53,379 27,612.8 
Observations 3,671 1,819 3,671 1,819 
Groups 262 246 262 246 
Notes: All models estimated with the conditional fixed-effects negative binominal estimator. Model 11-2,12-2 are 
restricted to a limited time period 2002-2009. כככ, ככ,and כ imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 1Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 to make effects visible.
